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11I n t r o d u c t i o n
The increased globalization of the economy has generated concerns about
the location of industries, especially those where ﬁr m ss e e mt ob ea b l et o
shift around production on a global scale. For policy-makers, these con-
cerns are primarily related to the potential loss of jobs from a relocation of
industries and its eﬀect on unemployment. However, as has been empha-
sized in the recent literature on trade and location, there are also concerns
about potential welfare losses from a relocation of activities generating pos-
itive externalities (e.g. Krugman, 1991). In particular, the location of high
tech industries characterized by the importance of research and development
(R&D) for generating new and improved products, may be of importance for
national welfare. Since the available empirical evidence suggests that R&D
activities generate positive spillovers that are geographically limited in scope
(e.g. Griliches, 1992 and Jaﬀe et al., 1993), regions that are successful in
attracting R&D activities may improve their welfare.
In most economic models, R&D is simply assumed to be located with
the rest of the ﬁrm’s activities. An implication of this assumption is that
countries with a comparative advantage in knowledge creation would also
have a comparative advantage in high-tech production.1 Figure 1 shows a
plot diagram of R&D expenditures in relation to GDP, and the share of high-
tech goods in total exports relative to their world-market share of exports for
a number of industrialized countries. As predicted by standard theory, there
is a positive correlation between these two variables (the solid line shows
the ﬁtted line from an OLS regression). However, there are some interesting
outliers. For instance, Sweden, which is the country with the highest ratio
between R&D expenditures and GDP, does not belong to the countries with
the highest share of high-tech goods in their exports. On the opposite side,
1Notable exceptions in this respect are papers analyzing vertically integrated multina-
tional ﬁrms, meaning ﬁr m sl o c t a i n gd i ﬀerent stages of their production process in diﬀerent
countries. Helpman (1984) developed a model where ﬁrms operating under monopolistic
competition could choose to locate their headquarters separately from their production
plants. In a recent paper by Markusen (1997), the same possibility arises in a more gen-
eral model where ﬁrms may be either vertically or horizontally integrated and where trade
costs create advantages from locating production in the proximity to consumers.
2Ireland has the highest share of high-tech goods in their exports, but does
not belong to the countries with the highest ratio between R&D expenditures
and GDP. A common feature of these two economies is the important role of
multinational enterprises (MNEs); Sweden being the home country of several
large MNEs and Ireland being the host country of many MNEs originating in
the US and Japan, as well as other European countries. Since a large part
of total R&D is carried out by MNEs, an immediately obvious potential
explanation for these two outliers is that they reﬂect the tendency of MNEs
to concentrate their R&D activities in their home countries while producing
R&D intensive goods elsewhere.2 Traditionally, R&D activities seem to
have been strongly concentrated in the parent ﬁrm, implying that R&D has
primarily taken place in the home country. This tendency is often taken to
be the main explanation why certain small countries, such as Sweden, with
large R&D expenditures in relation to GDP do not export high-tech goods
to the extent motivated by their R&D expenditures. More recently, R&D
activities seem to have become more dispersed in the sense of a larger share
taking place outside the ﬁrms’s home countries.
The apparent geographical separation between R&D and production ac-
tivities suggests that an appropriate analysis of the location choice of high-
tech ﬁrms should allow for such a separation. In this paper, we develop a
two-country model where ﬁrms may choose to locate their R&D activities
and their production plants in separate countries. Furthermore, we allow
for two diﬀerent sources of agglomeration economies: knowledge spillovers
associated with R&D activities and backward linkages associated with the
production of ﬁnal goods. The backward linkage arises from the combination
of increasing returns to scale in production and transaction costs associated
with cross-border trade. It makes it beneﬁcial for ﬁrms to locate their pro-
duction of ﬁnal goods in the larger market.3 This aspect of the model is
similar to recent models within the so-called ”new economic geography” (see
2This explanation for the case of Sweden is discussed in Hansson and Lundberg (1995).
3The backward linkage is related to the increase in demand arising when a ﬁrm moves
its production to a certain region, while the forward linkage is related to the decrease
in wage costs when nominal wages fall to compensate for falling consumer prices due to
reduced imports (Krugman, 1991, Fujita et al., 1999, Chapter 5).
3Fujita, Krugman and Venables, 1999).
Our model thus involves two diﬀerent mechanisms creating incentives for
the concentration of activities. However, counteracting these two centripetal
forces is the eﬀect on the return to scarce factors when R&D activities and
the production of high-tech goods compete for resources. We assume that
both these activities use inputs of skilled labor. The outcome in terms
of the ﬁrms’ location choices then depends on the interplay between the
advantages of concentrating activities in order to beneﬁt from externalities
and the disadvantages of locating skill-intensive activities where skilled labor
is relatively expensive.
In the paper, we focus on the location of high-tech production from a
small-country perspective and assume an asymmetry between countries in
terms of their sizes. We analyze how the location choices of high-tech ﬁrms
are aﬀected by the strength of pure externalities generated by R&D activities
and the strength of "pecuniary" externalities generated by linkages, thereby
being able to address issues related to the ambition of many small, industri-
alized countries of attracting high-tech production. The analysis is related
to work by Markusen (1997, 2002), which shows that a small country may
end up headquartering vertically integrated multinationals with production
in the larger country when the smaller country is relatively skill-abundant
and trade costs relatively low. A crucial diﬀerence between this analysis and
that by Markusen, however, is that agglomeration economies may not only
aﬀect the location of production activities, but also that of non-production
activities.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows: In section 2, we discuss
related literature on the location of high-tech industries. Section 3 presents
and discusses the model, while section 4 analyzes the location choice by
high-tech ﬁrms. Finally, section 5 concludes.
2 Related Literature
In an early paper, Krugman (1980) showed that the combination of increas-
ing returns to scale and transaction costs associated with cross-border trade
4may generate a so-called home-market eﬀect; a tendency for large countries
to host a disproportionately large share of production. The presence of scale
economies generates an incentive for ﬁrms to concentrate production in one
single location and, by locating production in a large market, ﬁrms get better
access to consumers. This home-market eﬀect serves as the basis for more
recent theorizing within the so-called new economic geography framework
(see Fujita et al., 1999).
In related work, multinational enterprises (MNEs) have been incorpo-
rated in trade-theoretic models by adding the assumption that there exist
joint inputs such as management, marketing and R&D which create multi-
plant economies of scale (e.g. Markusen 1984, Horstmann and Markusen,
1992, Brainard 1993, Markusen and Venables, 2000). In these models, the
location choices of MNEs crucially depend on the trade-oﬀ between the
beneﬁts from concentrating production in one location and those stemming
from locating in proximity to the consumers, thereby avoiding trade costs.
The MNEs arising in these models can be characterized as horizontal in the
sense of producing the same ﬁnal good in more than one country. However,
MNEs may also be vertical in the sense of carrying out diﬀerent stages of
the production process in diﬀerent countries. Vertical MNEs were analyzed
by Helpman (1984) using a trade model with monopolistic competition, but
without any trade costs. In Helpman’s analysis, a skilled-labor abundant
country may end up being the net exporter of headquarter services because
skill-intensive headquarters activities tend to be located there.
More recently, Markusen (1997, 2002) has developed a model incorpo-
rating horizontal as well as vertical MNEs. As in the analysis by Helpman
(1984), vertical MNEs arise when there are advantages in fragmenting the
production process into skill-intensive headquarter activities and less skill-
intensive production of the ﬁnal good. However, in Markusen’s analysis, the
equilibrium production structure is not only determined by diﬀerences in
factor proportions but also by the level of trade costs. This is important
since it may be especially advantageous to locate ﬁnal-goods production in
the large country when trade costs create beneﬁts from producing in prox-
imity to the consumer.
5Neither of these papers allow for the possibility that skill-intensive head-
quarters activities generate externalities. In the presence of such externali-
ties, e.g., knowledge spillovers from R&D activities, the location of headquar-
ters might be important from a welfare point of view. Knowledge spillovers
may arise because ﬁrms learn from each other, for example through co-
operation, by reverse-engineering each others’ products or as a consequence
of the turnover of highly specialized labor. Several studies have found evi-
dence of such knowledge spillovers (e.g. Jaﬀe et al., 1993, Acs et al., 1992,
1994, Feldman, 1994, and Audretsch and Feldman, 1996).
In our model, we assume knowledge spillovers generated by R&D ac-
tivities to be national in scope. If they were global in scope, there would
be no advantages of having local R&D activities. In fact, if technological
knowledge very easily diﬀuses across countries, it may even be beneﬁcial
to free-ride on the rest of the world by cutting back investments in R&D.
However, the fact that R&D activities tend to be geographically concen-
trated suggests that the knowledge spillovers may be geographically limited
in scope. For instance, Feldman and Audretsch (1996) ﬁnd that, control-
ling for the degree of geographical concentration of production, innovative
activity tends to cluster more in industries where knowledge spillovers play
a decisive role. Moreover, Jaﬀe et al. (1993) provide direct evidence of
geographically limited knowledge spillovers from R&D activities.4
Our model adds knowledge spillovers associated with R&D activities to
an analysis of the location choice of ﬁrms. The ﬁrms are potentially vertical
MNEs in the sense that they may choose to geographically separate their
R&D activities from their production of ﬁnal goods. Because we allow ﬁrms
to choose to locate their R&D activities in proximity to other R&D labs
in order to beneﬁt from knowledge spillovers, the analysis is related to the
literature on technology sourcing and so-called ”centres of excellence”. It has
been argued that MNEs locate R&D in ”centres of excellence” in order to
source the available technology (Kogut and Chang, 1991, Neven and Siotis,
1996). This type of technological externality may interact with a home-
market eﬀect in a mutually reinforcing way. However, at the same time, if
4See also work by Keller (2002).
6ﬁnal production and R&D activities draw on the same type of resources, as
is reasonable to expect when it comes to high-tech production, it may also
be the case that the concentration of one type of activity raises the prices
of these resources so much that the other type of activity will be located
elsewhere.5 It is the interaction between these forces that is the focus of the
present analysis.
3 The Model
We assume a two-country, two-factor and two-good model to analyze the
location choice by ﬁrms operating in a high-tech industry. There are two
countries, Home (H)a n dF o r e i g n( F), two factors of production, skilled
labor (S) and unskilled labor (L), and two ﬁnal goods, a homogeneous good,
Y , produced with constant returns to scale in a perfectly competitive sector
and a diﬀerentiated high-tech good, X, produced with economies of scale and
sold in markets characterized by monopolistic competition. The supply of
skilled and unskilled labor is given. Both factors of production are perfectly
mobile between sectors but completely immobile between countries. The
technology for producing the homogeneous good, Y , is linear and one unit
of L produces one unit of Y . Production of X requires inputs of ﬁrm-speciﬁc
knowledge (R), produced by R&D labs that may be located in a diﬀerent
country than production. Firms choosing to produce R and X in the same
country become national enterprises, while ﬁrms choosing to separate R&D
from production become multinational enterprises with a vertical production
structure. We use n to superscript variables associated with national ﬁrms
and m to superscript variables associated with multinational ﬁrms.
5A somewhat related analysis can be found in Ekholm and Torstensson (1997), where
the possibility of expanding high-tech production by means of production and R&D sub-
sidies is analyzed assuming that both R&D and the production of high-tech goods require
inputs of skilled labor.
73.1 Technology
R&D labs produce an input transferrable across national borders but not
tradable in the sense that it can be sold at arm’s length to any ﬁrm. R is as-
sumed to be directly supplied to the production plant within the same ﬁrm.
A motivation for this assumption is that asymmetric information and incom-
plete contracting may create strong incentives to internalize R&D within the
ﬁrm. However, at the same time, we assume the ﬁrms to be unable to com-
pletely internalize the beneﬁts from their R&D. We assume the ﬁrm-speciﬁc
knowledge produced by individual ﬁrms to spill over to all ﬁrms conducting
R&D in the same country. More speciﬁcally, we assume the cost of inventing
additional varieties in terms of inputs of skilled labor to decrease with the
amount of R&D conducted in the country. The production function of a
representative R&D lab is speciﬁed as follows:
Rij =
1







,g = n,m, (1)
where Rij is the amount of R&D produced by ﬁrm i in country j,t h es u m
Rj is aggregate R&D conducted in country j,a n dSRij the amount of skilled
labor employed by ﬁrm i to carry out R&D in country j. Parameter ρg ≥ 1
denotes a cost for geographically separating the production of R and X.6 We
assume that ρn =1and ρm > 1, which implies that there is no additional
cost incurred by national ﬁrms, only by multinational ﬁrms.
The production function speciﬁed in (1) has the property of augmenting
the productivity of skilled labor in a constant proportion to the number of
ﬁrms conducting R&D in the country. We have thus assumed that the R&D
spillovers obtained from an additional ﬁrm conducting R&D in the country
is independent of the initial size of the R&D sector. Alternative assumptions
could be made, i.e., increasing or decreasing productivity spillovers in the
R&D sector. However, since we have no information about the speciﬁc
6Our speciﬁcation in (1) implies that transferring R from one country to another in-
volves an ”iceberg” type of cost so that ρ ≥ 1 units must be shipped from the R&D lab
for one unit of R to arrive at the production plant located abroad.
8nature of R&D spillovers, we have simply chosen to model them as being
constant.
A cost-minimizing ﬁrm chooses SRi,t a k i n gt h el e v e lo fR as given, in
order to produce the technological knowledge required to produce a variety
of the high-tech product. That is, we assume that the ﬁrm takes potential
knowledge spillovers into account in its location decision. For a ﬁrm to enter
the market with a new variety, it must generate one unit of R.T h i si m p l i e s
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j is the number of national enterprises in country j and nm
k the
number of multinational enterprises conducting R&D in country j and pro-
ducing in country k (note that country subscripts denote the country where
the ﬁrm locates its production plant). A ﬁrm deciding to conduct its R&D
in the country with a larger total number of R&D labs needs to use a smaller
amount of skilled labor in order to produce its own single unit of R.
The high-tech ﬁrms then employ unskilled labor (L) and skilled labor
(S) to produce their ﬁnal products. There are ﬁxed costs in production,
creating an incentive for concentrating ﬁnal production to one country. More
speciﬁcally, we assume the following cost function of a representative high-
tech ﬁrm producing in region j:
c(wSj,w Lj,X ij | Ri =1 )=wα
Sjw1−α
Lj (β + γXij) (3)
where wSj and wLj are the returns to skilled and unskilled labor, respec-
tively, Xij is the level of output of the representative ﬁrm i, α ∈ [0,1],a n d
β and γ are positive constants.
3.2 Preferences
In modelling consumer preferences, we use the Dixit-Stiglitz speciﬁcation of
preferences for variety (Dixit and Stiglitz, 1977). A representative consumer
9has the following utility function:
U =( CX)










where CX is a subutility function capturing utility derived from the con-
sumption of diﬀerent varieties of high-tech goods; ci denotes the consump-
tion of each available variety, µ ∈ [0,1],a n dnw = nn + nm is the total
number of varieties produced.7
It is well-known that a two-stage budgeting procedure generates the
following expression for demand for an individual variety i (see e.g. Fujita










1−σ is a CES price index of manufacturing products
and E total expenditures.
Letting Y be numeraire, we get the following demand for Y :
CY =( 1− µ)E. (6)
3.3 Proﬁt Maximization of Firms
With symmetric ﬁrms operating in the two countries, H and F, the price


















j is the number of high-tech producing ﬁrms in country j (superscript
7Following e.g. Neary (2001), we assume a ﬁnite number of varieties instead of deﬁning
the subutility function CX over a continuum of varieties. This requires a suﬃciently large
number of ﬁrms for us to be able to approximate the elasticity of demand by σ (see
Helpman and Krugman, 1985, Chapter 6).
10g denotes national or multinational). Trade in X is assumed to involve an
iceberg type of transaction cost denoted by τ ≥ 1 (for one unit to arrive, τ
units must be shipped).
First-order conditions for proﬁt maximizing by a ﬁrm producing in coun-










where σ is the price elasticity of demand. Free entry and exit and a contin-
uous number of ﬁrms imply that in equilibrium, all active ﬁrms make zero
proﬁts. At the same time, these assumptions imply that a type of ﬁrm that
is not active in equilibrium, must make negative proﬁts. This means that
we have the following complementary slackness condition:
Π
g
j ≤ 0 n
g




j =0 . (9)














where the ﬁrst subscript of Xjj denotes the location of the production plant
and the second the market where the ﬁnal good is sold. The second term
in (10) represents the ﬁxed costs in production and the third term the cost
of producing one unit of R.P r o ﬁts of a multinational enterprise locating













The equilibrium conditions used to solve the model are ﬁrst-order conditions,
zero proﬁt conditions (in complementary slackness form) and conditions for
the clearing of factor and goods markets. To solve for the equilibrium, we



































































































(γ (Xjj + τXjk)+β) (wSj)
wLj ≥ 1. (Yj)
12The associated variables are given in parenthesis after each equilibrium con-





F , pH, pF, EH, EF, wSH, wSF, wLH, wLF, XHH,
XHF, XFF, XFH, YH,a n dYF.
4A n a l y s i s
In this model, the combination of increasing returns to scale and trade costs
creates a home-market eﬀect leading to a tendency for the larger country to
attract the ﬁnal production of the diﬀerentiated good. As in new economic-
geography models with intersectorally mobile, but regionally immobile, fac-
tors, the advantages of locating increasing returns to scale production in the
larger market are strongest for intermediate levels of trade costs.8
Because of the tendency for the ﬁnal goods production of X to become
concentrated in the large country, the small country may end up having an
advantage in producing R&D. That is, it may be cheaper to produce R&D
in the small country because skilled labor is relatively expensive in the large
country where most of the skill-intensive high-tech production takes place.
However, it may still be the case that R&D becomes concentrated in the
large country, since there are agglomeration economies working in the R&D
sector as well.
4.1 Stability of equilibria with only national ﬁrms
To begin with, note that in equilibrium, there will never be multinational
ﬁrms originating in both countries. If there are incentives for ﬁrms producing
in country j to conduct R&D in country k, there cannot simultaneously be
incentives for ﬁrms producing in country k to conduct R&D in country j.9
8See e.g. Krugman and Venables (1995), and Venables (1996).
9Formally, if ﬁrms producing in H have incentives to locate R&D in F,t h er e l a -
tive return to skilled labor in Home (wSH/wSF) must be greater than ρϕ,w h e r eϕ ≡









in F have incentives to locate R&D in H, the relative return to skilled labor in Home
must be smaller than ϕ/ρ.S i n c e1/ρ < ρ, both conditions cannot hold simultaneously.
13Suppose we start from a situation with only national ﬁrms. Assuming
H to be a smaller economy than F (i.e., H has less endowments of S and L
than F), conducting R&D in F will require smaller inputs of skilled workers
because the technological externality is larger. This means that there may
be incentives for ﬁrms producing in H to become multinationals by instead
locating their R&D activities in F. However, in order for a situation with
only national ﬁrms to be an equilibrium, there cannot be any such incentives.
This means that the costs of producing one unit of R must be at least as
high in F as in H, which requires that the following condition holds:
wSH
wSF
(1 − δ + δnn
F)
¡
1 − δ + δnn
H
¢ ≤ ρ. (11)
If the condition in (11) is satisﬁed, the reduction in production costs stem-
ming from stronger spillovers and possibly a lower return to skilled labor
in the large country is not suﬃcient to compensate for the additional costs
arising from a geographical separation between R&D and production. There
are three factors aﬀecting whether (11) holds: the relative return to skilled
labor in the two countries, the relative number of ﬁrms and the strength
of R&D externalities as captured by δ. If follows directly from (11) that
the higher the return to skilled labor in H relative to F and the larger the
number of ﬁrms in F relative to H, the higher the value of the left-hand side
of the condition in (11) and the less likely it is to be satisﬁed. It is also clear
that as long as nn
F >n n
H,ah i g h e rv a l u eo fδ will increase the value of the
left-hand side of (11).10 It follows from this that whether ﬁrms producing
in the small country have incentives to locate R&D in the large country de-
pends on the diﬀerence in size between the countries, the strength of R&D
externalities and the relative return to skilled labor. While diﬀerences in
size and the strength of R&D externalities are given by parameters of the
model, the relative return to skilled labor is endogenously determined and,
in particular, aﬀected by the level of trade costs.
10We will assume that the parameter δ can take values between zero and one.
14With only national ﬁrms operating, the diﬀerence in country size will,
through its eﬀect on the relative size of the R&D sector, always be a factor
pulling R&D labs in the direction of the larger country. However, since the
presence of a home-market eﬀect should put upward pressure on the return
to skilled labor in the larger country, there may also be a counteracting force
stemming from diﬀerences in factor prices, pulling R&D labs in the direction
of the smaller country. Whether this force is suﬃciently strong to outweigh
the one related to a diﬀerence in the size of the R&D sector depends on the
strength of the home market eﬀect, which in turn depends on the level of
trade costs. In the following, we shall analyze how the relative return to
skilled labor in the small country varies with the level of trade costs. This
analysis is done in order to bring out under what circumstances the net
eﬀect of the two opposing forces might be such that R&D labs are pulled in
the direction of the small country.
Assume that both countries produce Y so that wLH = wLF =1and that
there are only national ﬁrms operating in the high-tech sector. Using the
zero-proﬁt condition for national ﬁrms in H in the factor-market clearing








where ξH ≡ (1 − δ + δnn
H)
−1.11
This condition gives us the combinations of nn
H and wSH for which the
demand for skilled labor equals the ﬁxed supply. It is shown in Figure 2
as the upward sloping broken curve.12. The curve is upward sloping since a
larger number of high-tech ﬁrms leads to a larger demand for skilled labor,
implying an increased relative price of skilled labor being needed to restore
equilibrium in the factor market. The level of δ aﬀects the location of this
c u r v es ot h a tah i g h e rl e v e lo fδ shifts the curve downwards (i.e. reduces the
11See the Appendix for the derivation of the condition.
12The following parameter values have been used to plot the curve: SH =2 0 ,δ=0 .05,
α =0 .5,β=0 .1,µ=0 .7, and σ =7 .5.
15demand for skilled labor for a given number of ﬁrms).
{Figure 2: Goods and factor-market clearing with national ﬁrms only}
In order to ﬁnd the equilibrium value of nn
H and wSH, we need to ensure
that goods markets clear as well. Combining the zero-proﬁt condition with
supply equals demand for a representative national ﬁrm producing in Home
































This condition gives us the combinations of nn
H and wSH for which supply
equals demand in the market for high-tech goods for a given number of
ﬁrms and return to skilled workers in Foreign. As is evident from (13),
this condition is aﬀected by the level of trade costs. In Figure 2, there are
three curves plotting this condition: one for free trade (τ =1 .0), one for an
intermediate level of trade costs (τ =1 .25)a n do n ef o rah i g hl e v e lo ft r a d e
costs (τ =2 .0).14 The location of the curves diﬀers depending on the level
of τ.
When the home-market eﬀect is strong, i.e. the trade cost is at an in-
termediate level, the return to skilled labor consistent with goods market
clearing is lower for a given number of ﬁrms compared to when it is weak,
i.e. the trade cost is either low or high.15 This implies that for low and high
13See the Appendix for the derivation of the condition.
14The following values of the additional parameters have been used: δ =0 .05,α=0 .5,
β =0 .1,µ=0 .7,σ=7 .5, γ =1 ,S H =2 0 ,L H =2 0 ,S F =4 0 ,L F =4 0 ,n
n
F =1 2 .79,a n d
wSF =0 .65.T h ev a l u e s o f n
n
F and wSF have been chosen so as to be consistent with a
free trade equilibrium.
15This is true at least when δ is suﬃciently low and the given number of ﬁr m si sc l o s e
to the equilibrium value. For relatively high levels of δ, however, increases in τ lead to
16levels of trade costs, the equilibrium price of skilled workers may be suﬃ-
c i e n t l yh i g hi nH o m ea sc o m p a r e dt oF o r e i g nf o rh i g h - t e c hﬁrms producing
in Home to want to shift the location of their R&D activities to Foreign. For
intermediate levels of trade costs, on the other hand, it is less likely that the
ﬁrms will have incentives to shift the location of R&D, since the equilibrium
price of skilled workers is lower. In Figure 2, the return to skilled labor in
Foreign has been set to 0.65, which is the equilibrium value generated by the
full model in free trade. This means that for the parameter values chosen,
the return to skilled labor will actually be lower in Home than in Foreign for
all three levels of trade costs. For high-tech ﬁrms considering moving their
R&D activities to the larger country, there is thus a trade-oﬀ: the amount of
skilled workers they must employ will be smaller but the wage they must pay
will be higher. If the technological externality is relatively small so that the
former eﬀect is weak, it may even be the case that high-tech ﬁrms producing
in Foreign have incentives to move their R&D labs to the smaller country
in order to take advantage of the lower costs of hiring skilled workers. If
this were the case, the small country would become specialized in conduct-
ing R&D while a substantial part of actual high-tech production would take
place in the large country.
4.2 Numerical Simulations
The previous section showed that for given production costs and number of
ﬁrms in Foreign, there may be incentives to locate R&D in Home. Whereas
the analysis shows the possibility of an equlibrium where Home is specialized
in R&D activities, it does not establish that such an equilibrium will occur
when wages and number of ﬁrms in Foreign are allowed to be determined
endogenously. In order to solve the full model, however, we have to rely
on numerical simulations.16 Diﬀerent equilibria are characterized by the
diﬀerent types of ﬁrms that are active (national ﬁrms located in H and F
will be denoted by nH and nF, respectively, whereas multinational ﬁrms
successive downward shifts of the goods market clearing curve.
16In the simulations discussed below we have used the follwing parameter values: µ =
0.9,α=0 .5,β=0 .1,γ=1 ,σ=7 .5,ρ=1 .1,S H =2 0 ,L H =2 0 ,S F =8 0and LF =8 0 .
17producing high-tech goods in H and F will be denoted by mH,a n dmF),
by the pattern of specialization and the concentration of R&D activities in
each of the two countries. We are mainly interested in the two parameters
δ and τ, one capturing the strength of R&D externalities and the other the
strength of the home-market eﬀect (although not in a monotonic way). That
i s ,w es o l v et h em o d e lf o rd i ﬀerent values of parameters δ and τ.W i t hw e a k
R&D externalities, there are weak incentives for ﬁrms to concentrate R&D
activities in one of the countries. Close to free trade and autarky, the home-
market eﬀect is weak and therefore, there are only weak incentives for ﬁrms
to concentrate their production activities in the large country. However, at
the intermediate levels of trade costs, the home-market eﬀect is relatively
strong, which implies that ﬁrms have an incentive to locate the production
of high-tech goods in the large country.
4.2.1 Location of Production and R&D
We ﬁrst analyze a benchmark case with no externalities in the R&D sec-
tor, that is δ =0 . This case corresponds to one of the cases analyzed by
Markusen (1997), namely that countries of diﬀe r e n ts i z eh a v ei d e n t i c a lr e l a -
tive factor endowments and trade costs are moderately high. Figure 3 shows
Home’s share of the total number of R&D labs and its share of total high-
tech production. At free trade and high levels of trade costs, Home’s share of
total R&D and total high-tech production is proportional to its relative size,
thereby implying that there is no specialization in either high-tech produc-
tion or R&D and only national ﬁrms are active. However, at intermediate
level of trade costs, the home-market eﬀect is relatively strong, inducing a
relatively large share of ﬁrms to locate their high-tech production in the
large country (F). As was clear from Figure 2, this implies that the price of
skilled labor tends to increase, creating a factor market reason for high-tech
ﬁrms to locate R&D activities in the small country (H). Hence, for inter-
mediate levels of trade costs, there are, in equilibrium, multinational ﬁrms
producing high-tech goods in the large country, while carrying out R&D
in the small country. Within this range of trade costs, the large country
18specializes in the production of high-tech goods, while the small country
specializes in R&D.17
{Figure 3: Benchmark case with no R&D externalities}
Another benchmark case is one where there are R&D externalities, but
no trade costs. In this case, the R&D externalities create incentives for
ﬁrms to locate their R&D activities in the same country. Figures 4 and 5
show that for levels of δ close to zero, both R&D activities and production
activities are spread out between the countries in proportion to their size.
However, beyond a certain threshold level of δ, R&D activities tend to be-
come concentrated in one of the countries. For the distribution of overall
resources assumed in Figure 4, activities agglomerate in either of the regions
beyond this threshold level, although we cannot determine in which. With
larger size diﬀerences, however, a concentration of R&D activities in the
large country would be the only stable equilibrium for relatively low levels
of δ, since in that case, the amount of skilled labor available in the small
country would not be suﬃcient to support the entire R&D sector. There is
also an unstable equilibrium where R&D activities are conducted in both
countries. It is unstable in the sense of a small perturbation of the equi-
librium creating incentives for ﬁrms of diﬀerent types to exit and enter, so
that we end up in one of the equilibria with total concentration of R&D
activities.18
{Figure 4: Home’s share of R&D activities in a benchmark case with
free trade}
17With the size diﬀerences chosen in Figure 2, both countries produce the high-tech
good for all levels of τ. However, with larger size diﬀerences between Home and Foreign,
high-tech production may become completely concentrated in the large country.
18The issue of stability has been analyzed by examining whether the total costs for
conducting R&D would increase or decrease for a ﬁrm moving its R&D activities from
one country to another, keeping the location of production ﬁxed.
19{Figure 5: Home’s share of high-tech production in the benchmark case
with free trade}
In order to analyze how R&D externalities and agglomeration economies
created by a home-market eﬀect interact in determining the location struc-
ture, we look at cases where we either keep the degree of R&D externalities
ﬁxed, varying the level of trade costs, or vice versa.F i r s t ,w ec h o o s ear e l -
ative country size that does not prevent a concentration of R&D activities
in the smaller country due to a resource restriction. Figure 6 shows a case
where we keep R&D externalities at a constant level; a relatively low one
in this particular case (δ =0 .01). The R&D externalities create incentives
for ﬁrms to locate their R&D activities in the same country at the same
time as they have an incentive to locate production in the large country
for intermediate levels of trade costs. As seen in Figure 6, at relatively low
levels of trade costs, we get an agglomeration of R&D in either the large or
the small country. In addition, there is an unstable equilibrium, marked by
a dashed line, where R&D activities are spread between the countries. For
a range of intermediate trade costs where the home-market eﬀect is partic-
ularly strong, a concentration of R&D activities in the large country is not
possible, however. In this case, both agglomeration of R&D in the small
country and dispersion of R&D are stable equilibria. For relatively high
trade costs, both countries will be engaged in producing high-tech products
since high-tech ﬁrms are mainly producing for their domestic market. In
this situation, both high-tech production and R&D are spread and there is
no agglomeration of either high-tech activity.
{Figure 6: Case with moderate R&D externalities}
In Figures 7 and 8, we have assumed stronger R&D externalities (δ =
0.2). As is clear from these ﬁgures, agglomeration of R&D is the outcome
for all levels of τ. Once more, we cannot determine whether R&D becomes
concentrated in the large or the small country, and there is an unstable equi-
20librium where R&D activities are spread between the countries. Irrespective
of whether R&D concentrates in H or F, however, there is a tendency for
F to specialize in high-tech production for intermediate levels of τ because
of the home-market eﬀe c t( s e eF i g u r e8 ) .
{Figure 7: Home’s share of R&D for relatively strong R&D externalities}
{Figure 8: Home’s share of high-tech production for relatively strong
R&D externalities}
Figure 9 shows Home’s share of R&D activities in the case where we
keep trade costs ﬁxed at a level where the home-market eﬀect is especially
strong and let the parameter δ vary. From Figure 3, we know that we should
ﬁnd an equilibrium where the small country specializes in R&D activities
and the large country in high-tech production for low levels of δ.T h i s i s
also what we ﬁnd in Figure 9. For high levels of δ,w eﬁnd an agglomeration
of R&D activities in either country and an unstable equilibrium with R&D
activities spread out, just as would be expected from Figure 7. Within
ac e r t a i nr a n g eo fδ, however, we now have a case of multiple equilibria
in the sense of both concentration and dispersion of R&D being possible.
R&D may be concentrated in the small country or may become spread out
to both countries. However, it cannot become concentrated in the large
country because the home-market eﬀect creates a tendency for high-tech
production to be located in the large country, which puts upward pressure
on the return to skilled labor there. Only if R&D spillovers are suﬃciently
strong, the advantages of locating R&D in proximity to other R&D labs in
the large country outweigh the disadvantage of incurring higher costs for
inputs of skilled labor.
{Figure 9: Home’s share of R&D for strong home-market eﬀect}
21{Figure 10: Home’s share of high-tech production for strong home-
market eﬀect}
From Figure 10, which shows Home’s share of high-tech production, we
s e et h a tf o ras u ﬃciently high level of δ, the small country may produce high-
tech goods even when R&D activities are completely concentrated there.
The reason is that high levels of δ are associated with relatively low demand
for skilled labor from the R&D sector. This means that the return to skilled
labor in the smaller country becomes suﬃciently low for some ﬁrms to ﬁnd
it proﬁtable to produce high-tech goods in the smaller market.
4.2.2 Product Variation and Welfare
The Dixit-Stiglitz speciﬁcation of preferences implies that a higher degree of
product variation reduces the price index and the cost of attaining a given
level of utility. Welfare thus increases in the number of varieties produced.
The price index is also aﬀected by the level of trade costs; both directly
and through the eﬀect on the share of imported goods. Due to the eﬀect
of the share of imports on the price index, the per capita utility tends to
be higher in the large country (except in the limiting case where trade is
completely costless). This eﬀect may be even stronger when there are R&D
externalities if R&D agglomerates in the small country, since the share of
imports of high-tech goods from the large country will then be even higher.
The eﬀect on welfare can be assessed by calculating per-capita utility
according to the following expression:
uj =





In order to assess the welfare implications, we ﬁrst analyze the degree
of product variation associated with diﬀerent equilibria. When there are
no R&D externalities at all, the number of produced varieties only varies
marginally with changes in trade costs. The degree of product variation is
highest in free trade and autarky and lowest for intermediate levels of trade
22costs where the resources spent on shipping the high-tech good reduce the
resources available for developing varieties. However, when there are R&D
externalities, the degree of product variation will depend on the location of
R&D activities. Product variation tends to be larger when R&D is agglom-
erated than when it is dispersed and it is larger when it is agglomerated
in the large country than when it is agglomerated in the small economy.
However, as shown in Figure 11, it is possible that the degree of product
variation is higher when R&D agglomerates in the smaller country. This
occurs when R&D externalities are relatively strong (δ =0 .2) and trade
costs are such that the home-market eﬀect is strong. In this case, there are
especially strong incentives for ﬁrms to locate their production of high-tech
goods in the large country, leading resources to be freed up in the small
country to conduct more R&D. More R&D leads to more varieties, and
therefore the degree of product variation is the highest in such a situation.
{Figure 11: The degree of product variation for relatively strong R&D
spillovers}
Now, we use equation (14) to analyze the level of per-capita utility in
both countries in the diﬀerent equilibria. Figure 12 shows the case where
there are relatively strong spillovers (δ =0 .2). Naturally, welfare is at a gen-
erally higher level as compared to the case without spillovers. Furthermore,
irrespective of where R&D ends up being concentrated, Foreign’s welfare is
higher than Home’s for all levels of τ but the free trade level. However,
whether the welfare of a particular country is higher in one type of equilib-
rium as compared to another depends crucially on the level of trade costs.
As shown by the location of the curves in Figure 12, for relatively low levels
of τ, welfare is the lowest in Home and the highest in Foreign when R&D
activities are concentrated in Home. For relatively high levels of τ,o nt h e
other hand, it is the other way around, welfare is the highest in Home and
the lowest in Foreign when R&D activities are concentrated in Home.
The concentration of R&D activities in one country frees up resources
for high-tech production in the other country, thereby leading to a relatively
23low import share and lower consumer prices. The country that carries out all
the R&D activities, on the other hand, suﬀers from being able to produce
less domestic varieties of the high-tech good, thereby having a relatively
high import share and high consumer prices. Thus, in this setting, becoming
specialized in R&D activities is not necessarily associated with welfare gains.
As shown in Figure 12, a country suﬀers a welfare loss from being specialized
in R&D activities for low and intermediate levels of trade costs.19
At the same time, the concentration of R&D activities in one country
puts upward pressure on the return to skilled labor in that country. Apart
from having a positive eﬀect on income, this also makes it more costly to
separate R&D activities from production, since these costs are incurred in
terms of skilled labor. When the home-market eﬀect is relatively strong, this
eﬀect is outweighed by the strong incentives for producing high-tech goods in
the larger Foreign for ﬁrms with R&D activities in Home. However, when the
home-market eﬀect is relatively weak, as it is for high trade costs, the higher
costs associated with the multinational strategy changes the composition of
high-tech production so that relatively more production takes place in Home
and relatively less in Foreign. The consequence of this is lower consumer
prices in Home and higher in Foreign, which is why, for higher levels of
τ, Home’s welfare tends to be higher and Foreign’s lower when R&D is
concentrated in Home.20
19The exception to this is at the free trade level, where the country hosting an agglomer-
ation of R&D will have a higher return to skilled labor. In this case, there will co-existence
of national ﬁrms and multinational ﬁrms with R&D activities in one country. Since the
ﬁxed costs for conducting R&D are higher for the multinational ﬁrms than for the national
ﬁrms (because of the separation cost ρ), the costs associated with plant production must
be lower for the multinationals in order for the zero proﬁt conditions for both types of
ﬁr m st ob es a t i s ﬁed. This implies that the return to skilled labor in the country where the
multinational ﬁrms carry out their plant production h a st ob el o w e rt h a ni nt h ec o u n t r y
where they carry out their R&D. As is evident from Figure 12, however, the diﬀerence in
per-capita utility is very small.
20We have also analyzed the welfare implications of diﬀerent equilibria at moderate
R&D externalities (δ =0 .01). Product variation is then smaller when R&D concentrates
in Home (as it only does for low/intermediate trade costs). However, Home’s per-capita
utility is the highest in the equilibrium in which R&D is concentrated in Home for relatively
low trade costs. In this equilibrium, there is only one type of ﬁrm: multinational ﬁrms
producing in Foreign and conducting R&D in Home. The positive eﬀect of an upward
pressure on wages for skilled labor in Home from the concentration of R&D activities
24{Figure 12: Welfare for relatively strong R&D spillovers}
The result that specialization in R&D may be associated with a welfare
loss is worth emphasizing. This welfare loss occurs even though the external-
ity associated with R&D activities has been assumed to be purely national
in scope in the sense of one ﬁrm’s R&D activities only aﬀecting other ﬁrms
with R&D located in the same country. It is the interaction with the pe-
cuniary externality stemming from backward linkages that generates this
result. Since there are two activities generating externalities at the same
time as they are competing for resources, the outcome in terms of welfare
depends on the relative strength of welfare improving eﬀects generated by
the two types of externalities. Part of the beneﬁt from R&D spillovers is
global since they generate increased product variety, beneﬁtting both coun-
tries. The eﬀect that is purely national is to raise wages of skilled labor in
the country where R&D concentrates. This then has to be weighed against
the eﬀect on consumer prices stemming from producing a smaller share of
the high-tech products domestically. Depending on the strength of R&D
spillovers and the level of trade costs, Home may either lose or gain from
becoming specialized in R&D activities.
4.2.3 Relative Size
T h er e l a t i v es i z eo fc o u n t r i e sm a ya ﬀect the results obtained above. In
particular, an important issue is how the strength of the home-market eﬀect
is aﬀected as countries become more symmetric in size. Above, we showed
that for moderate R&D externalities and the level of trade costs creating
as t r o n gh o m e - m a r k e te ﬀect, R&D activities can only be concentrated in
the small country. When R&D externalities are stronger or trade costs
are lower, however, a concentration of R&D activities in the large country
becomes possible. This suggests that externalities in the R&D sector can
partly oﬀset the home-market eﬀect.
outweigh the negative eﬀect on the price index from having to import all varieties. At
higher trade costs, however, the latter eﬀect dominate and Home’s welfare is higher when
R&D activities are dispersed.
25In order to analyze how the location pattern is aﬀected by changes in
relative size, we solve the model by varying Home’s share of a ﬁxed total
supply of S and L and keeping the level of trade costs and externalities con-
stant. Figure 13 shows the case with a strong home-market eﬀect (τ =1 .2)
and moderate externalities (δ =0 .01). We ﬁn dt h es a m et y p eo fe q u i l i b r i a
as shown in Figure 6. Within an interval where Home’s share of overall
resources is between around 0.2 and 0.4, there are three equilibria: one in
which the share of R&D activities is equal to relative country size, one in
which R&D tends to concentrate in the smaller country, and one (unsta-
ble) in which R&D activities are spread out disproportionately between the
countries. When Home’s share of overall resources is lower than 0.2, we
ﬁnd that the only stable equilibrium is the ﬁrst one; the one in which the
share of R&D activities corresponds to relative country size. Within this
interval, Home is not suﬃciently large to host all R&D activities and there-
fore, there will not be a concentration of R&D activities, although there
are incentives to locate R&D in the smaller country. When Home’s share
of overall resources is higher than 0.4, we ﬁnd an additional unstable equi-
librium in which Home’s share of R&D activities is small. Throughout the
range in which Home’s relative size is above 0.2, an equilibrium with R&D
concentrated in Home is a stable equilibrium.21 Thus, in order for such an
equilibrium to be possible, Home cannot be too small in relation to the rest
of the world.
{Figure 13: Relative country size and equilibria with moderate external-
ities}
21In the case with strong externalities (δ =0 .2), a concentration of R&D activities can
occur in Home at a relative country size equal to around 0.1. For a higher share, the
equilibria are the same as in Figure 7.
265C o n c l u s i o n s
This paper has analyzed location choice by ﬁrms operating in a high-tech sec-
tor on the assumption that there are two sources of agglomeration economies:
knowledge spillovers from R&D activities and backward linkages between
ﬁrms. These two sources generate agglomeration economies aﬀecting the
choice of locating R&D diﬀerently from the choice of locating high-tech pro-
duction. The pecuniary externality in the form of linkages creates incentives
for high-tech ﬁrms to concentrate production in the larger economy, while
the technological externality creates incentives for ﬁrms to locate R&D labs
in proximity to other R&D labs. Because skilled labor is assumed to be
used in both production and R&D, the tendency for production activities
to concentrate in the large country, thereby putting upward pressure on the
return to skilled labor, implies that at the same time, there may be ad-
vantages associated with locating R&D in the small economy. When trade
costs are such that the pecuniary externality is particularly strong while the
technological externality is not too weak and not too strong, we get multiple
equilibria: in one equilibrium, R&D activities are completely concentrated
in the smaller economy and in another, they are spread out between coun-
tries. With strong R&D spillovers, R&D becomes concentrated in either
country.
We also compare diﬀerent outcomes with respect to the degree of product
variation and welfare. The most beneﬁcial case for the large country from
a welfare point of view may be when R&D is concentrated in the small
country. In this case, resources are freed up for the production of high-tech
goods in the large country. Because the consumer price index increases with
the share of imported products, this means that real income tends to be
higher than when these resources are spent conducting R&D. For the small
country, it may for similar reasons be beneﬁcial to have R&D activities
concentrated in the large country. Being specialized in R&D activities tends
to draw resources from the production of high-tech products and with a
larger import share, consumer prices tend to be higher. The opposing eﬀect
is an upward pressure on wages of skilled labor, which leads to higher incomes
27and to the multinational strategy to become more costly, thereby inducing
more domestic production. However, when R&D externalities are relatively
strong, this eﬀect is only suﬃciently strong to outweigh the negative eﬀect
on consumer prices for relatively high trade costs. In this analysis, it is
thus not necessarily welfare improving for a country to specialize in R&D
activities, even though these activities are associated with externalities that
are national rather than global in scope.
The possibility of having R&D concentrated in a small country ﬁts in
well with the observation that small, skill-labor abundant countries such as
Sweden and Finland are among those with the highest R&D expenditures
as a share of their GDP, but not necessarily among those most specialized in
high-tech production. In particular in the case of Sweden, it seems clear that
the focus on R&D activities is related to Sweden being the home country
of many MNEs operating in the high-tech sector and conducting R&D at
home, but carrying out a substantial part of their actual production in the
large OECD economies.
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Derivation of equilibrium condition (12)
Assume that both countries produce Y so that wLj = wLk =1and





1 − δ + δnn
j
¢−1 + α(wSj)
α−1 (γ (Xjj + τXjk)+β)
i
. (15)
The equilibrium price of a diﬀerentiated good is given by the ﬁrst-order


























Setting proﬁts to zero yields:
γwα








Solving for Xjj + τXjk gives us:
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which corresponds to expression (12).
Derivation of equilibrium condition (13)
Assume once more that both countries produce Y so that wLj = wLk =1
and that only national ﬁrms are operating. The condition that supply equals
demand for a diﬀerentiated good produced in country j is given by:












Substituting pj in (23) for the equilibrium price in (16) gives us:














w h i c hc a nb er e w r i t t e na s :

















Substituting the left-hand side of (25) for Xjj + τXjk given by the zero






















































Using the expression for the equilibrium price in (16), we get the follow-


















Noting that Ej is given by wSjSj +Lj and using the expression for the CES
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Figure 1: R&D expenditures and exports of high-tech products in 2000.
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Figure 8: Home’s share of high-tech production for relatively strong R&D














































































































































Figure 10: Home’s share of high-tech production for a strong home-market
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Figure 11: The degree of product variation for relatively strong R&D exter-
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Figure 13: Relative country size and equilibria with moderate externalities.
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